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Further Arguments against 
   Incongruity Theory
by Robert L. Latta
 Take a case in which the stimulus side of the humor process may be said to manifest 
an incongruity (from a certain point of view). Incongruity theorists maintain that the 
humor process commences with a recognition of that incongruity (or some other in-
congruity the stimulus side manifests), and maintain that this recognition is by no 
means irrelevant to the experience of humor, that, on the contrary, given the requisite 
circumstances, it (somehow) precipitates the entire humor process, as it were. But this 
implies that there is a substantial degree of identity between the process of registering 
the incongruity on the one hand and the humor process in its entirety on the other, 
that to a substantial extent, the former is the latter, and that even from the point in 
time at which the latter goes beyond the former, if it does, the two processes form a 
coherent whole. Thus if incongruity theorists are right about the way in which the 
humor process commences and proceeds, it is to be expected that there will prove to 
be no significant discrepancy between the process of registering the incongruity in the 
case, on the one hand, and the humor process on the other. This expectation is not, 
however, born out. Incongruity is a reciprocal relation: if A is incongruous with B, 
then by the same token and equally, B is incongruous with A. Essentially, then, an in-
congruity is a unit; it is something registered all at once. In surveying an  incongruity, 
one might perhaps focus first on one term then on the other, but this shift in focus has 
no essential direction; one might shift attention from A to B and from B to A and back 
and forth any number of times, but if the one slips entirely from mind while the focus 
is on the other, then no incongruity is perceived, for to perceive the incongruity is to 
see that A and B don't go together. The rub is that the humor process in the relevant 
cases—those in which the stimulus side may be said to manifest an incongruity and 
there is clearly a shift in focus of attention from one term to the other of that incon-
gruity—lacks, for the most part anyway, this feature of reversibility. In most if not all 
cases of this type, to obtain a humorous effect, or at any rate just the humorous effect 
that is obtained, the subject must shift attention from A to B: shifting from B to A 
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does not bring the effect in question. To put it abstractly, the process of registering an 
incongruity shows a certain characteristic, the humor process, in those cases in which 
it is possible to ask whether it shows that characteristic, in fact shows, for the most 
part at any rate, a contrary characteristic, and thus, contrary to incongruity theory, it 
cannot be that the process of registering an incongruity constitutes the initial, deter-
minative stage or an integral, substantial part of the subject's mental processing. 
 An example might serve to make this clear. Consider John Allen Paulos's claim in 
his Mathematics and Humor (Chicago, 1980) that the dignified movements of Charlie 
Chaplin "clash humorously" with his appearance as a powerless little man. It may be 
granted that Chaplin's dignified movements on the  one hand and the various indica-
tions which give away the fact that he is a powerless little man—his shabby clothing, 
childlike gaze, slight physique, etc. on the other do present an incongruity from an 
analytical point of view. It's essential to note, however, that in the process of 
registering this incongruity, in discovering it and confirming its existence, it makes no 
 difference whether one shifts attention from the dignified movements to the factors 
which indicate powerlessness or vice versa. The question is whether the same may be 
said of a subject who wishes to enjoy the humor in the case. On the one hand, if the 
subject first notes Chaplin's dignified movements and then notes his shabby clothing 
and the like, there is of course a considerable chance that he will be amused. This is 
comparable to the case Koestler describes in which a person first sees a fiercely 
barking dog as dangerous and then suddenly sees that in fact it's just a harmless 
puppy at play. On the other hand, it's more or less clear intuitively that if the subject 
happens to fasten first on the fact that the Chaplin-character is a powerless little man, 
and then shifts attention from this to the dignified movements and doesn't shift atten-
tion back to the shabby clothing and the like (as he surely would if he were simply 
watching a Chaplin movie for pleasure), he will not experience humor. This case is 
comparable to one in  which a person first sees a fiercely barking dog as a harmless 
puppy and then suddenly sees that in fact it's a vicious, dangerous adult. The point, 
however, is that since the process of registering the incongruity in question shows re-
versibility in the sense described and the humor process in the case doesn't, it cannot 
be that the latter begins with the former. 
               * * 
 In many cases in which the stimulus side of the humor process manifests an incon-
gruity (from a certain point of view), there is an obviously central cognitive switch, 
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but the incongruity shows no connection with the cognitive switch of a sort that 
might satisfy the requirements of incongruity theory. In other words, the incongruity 
lacks any essential connection with that which is, quite obviously, the guts of the 
humor process. Examples: (1) In the case of the greyhound with a speeding bus 
tattooed on its side, there is only one incongruity  the stimulus side may be said to 
manifest: its terms are the dog and the bus-tattoo. Now it is all but undeniable that in 
responding to this jest, the typical subject makes an effort, though perhaps only a 
brief one, to puzzle out the point of the tattoo, then sees the point, and then experi-
ences amusement, and all but undeniable that these steps constitute the core of the 
humor process. (Cases  in which the subject sees the point immediately, without puz-
zling, may be set aside for the moment. Let us consider the case in which the humor 
process unfolds in the way just described.) This process involves, of course, a 
cognitive switch. It's important, however, to identify the terms of this switch—that 
from which and that to which the subject switches correctly. He switches from an 
orientation which might be expressed in the words "What's the point of this tattoo?" 
to one which might be expressed "I see." It is a cognitive switch to "I see," that is, to 
the realization that the puzzle has been solved, which brings a laugh, but the preced-
ing, corresponding state is a state of puzzlement over the question "What's the point?" 
It is clear, then, that in this case the terms of the incongruity (the dog and the tattoo) 
and the terms of the cognitive switch which brings a laugh (the two orientations just 
described) are entirely different. To make the cognitive switch is not to shift attention 
from the dog to the tattoo or vice versa: it is to do something quite different. What 
connection, then, might the incongruity have with the cognitive switch? The obvious 
reply is that it is a recognition of the incongruity which stimulates  the subject to 
puzzle as to the point of the tattoo—that is to say, which sets off the process which 
leads to the cognitive switch. This, however, won't do. If that which lies at the core of 
the humor process in this case is a shift from puzzlement to insight, as it clearly is, 
then it is inessential that the subject start by recognizing the incongruity in question, 
for his puzzlement need not stem from a recognition of this incongruity. He can begin, 
and indeed may be expected to begin, with the assumption that there is no incongrui-
ty. That which sets off the process of puzzlement which leads to the cognitive switch 
which brings laughter in this case is not the thought "This is incongruous,  " but 
rather the question "How is this congruous?" The thought "This is incongruous," if it 
suggests any question at all, suggests the question "Why has this incongruity been 
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concocted?" This, however, is the wrong question. The correct reply to it is "Forget 
about incongruity and look for the point." The upshot, then, is that the incongruity in 
question has no essential connection with the core of the humor process. Hence it 
cannot be that the subject must recognize this incongruity in order to perceive the 
humor in the case. 
 (2) Now consider the example from Sherlocke Holmes: "Did you hear a woman howl-
ing in the night?" Here the subject makes a cognitive switch from absorption in the 
story to an uninvolved stance, and it is, all but undeniably, this shift that brings a 
chuckle. It is a case of "falling out of context." It is to be noted, incidentally, that 
falling out of context in this sense does not necessarily entail taking a critical stance; 
indeed, to take such a stance is to put oneself in a serious frame of mind which hinders 
amusement. Now let us ask: if there may be said to be an incongruity here, what are 
its terms? They are not the terms of the cognitive switch just described, for the terms 
of this switch are not mutually incongruous: there is nothing in  the least incongruous 
in being engrossed in the story one moment and uninvolved the next. There is indeed 
a discontinuity in this sequence, but a discontinuity is not an incongruity. Is it incon-
gruous that person was alive ten seconds ago and is dead now? Not if he just fell off a 
cliff. The terms of the incongruity the present case may be said to manifest are, rather, 
the preceding pages of the story (and, irrelevantly, the following pages), and the short 
passage in question. These are incongruous in that the former are skillfully written 
and the latter unskillfully. To recapitulate, then, the terms of the effective cognitive 
switch are engrossment and uninvolvement and those of the incongruity the preceding 
pages and the passage in question. Now it is due to the excellence (the modest excel-
lence at any rate) of Conan Doyle's writing in the preceding pages that the reader 
becomes engrossed in the story, and due to his momentary failure to maintain this 
standard at the point in question that the reader falls out of context. The terms of the 
incongruity, the preceding pages and the passage in question, then, do figure in the 
humor process (as might be expected in this case); it is the transition the reader quite 
literally makes from the former to the latter in the course of reading which prompts 
him to make the effective cognitive switch from engrossment to detachment. It is, 
however, one thing for the terms of an incongruity to figure in the humor process in a 
given case, and quite another for that incongruity itself to figure there. In this case, 
 there  is no reason to suppose that a recognition of the incongruity in question contrib-
utes in any way to the effective cognitive switch. This incongruity appears only from 
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a critical point of view: anyone who notes that the preceding pages are skillfully writ-
ten and the passage in question unskillfully has put himself in the position of a critic. 
But this critical observation is utterly sober and not in the least funny, and the corre-
sponding critical point of view not at all conducive to the experience of humor. How 
can it be, then, that a recognition of the incongruity in question figures essentially in 
the humor process? Clearly, it doesn't. 
                  * *
 The thesis that the basic humor process, and hence the humor process in every par-
ticular case, involves the recognition of an incongruity as an essential component 
stands in isolation: no facet, or hardly any, of the phenomenon of humor can success-
fully be traced to or from it. This entails, of course, that it has little or no explanatory 
value. Here are a few questions, out of very many, which it is impossible to answer 
plausibly by reference to this thesis but possible to answer quite naturally in terms of 
the cognitive-switch theory. Since the main point is the vacuity of the usual incongrui-
ty thesis, the explanations in terms of the cognitive-switch theory shall merely be 
outlined. 
 (1) Why is it that, typically if not always, the humor process in a particular case ends 
in or at any rate leads to laughter of some form? Explanation by reference to the usual 
incongruity thesis: The problem here is to connect the recognition of an incongruity 
with the occurrence of laughter. The simplest explanation runs as follows: The subject 
must be in the right mood, or at any rate not in the wrong mood, and the incongruity 
must be of the right type, or at any rate not of the wrong type—for example, it must 
not be terribly threatening. The subject recognizes the incongruity, finds it funny, and 
laughs because laughter is the natural expression of the feeling of amusement. —This, 
however, won't do at all, for several reasons. The main objection is that incongruities 
simply aren't funny: the point of view from which an incongruity appears is serious 
and unconducive to the experience of humor. Thus the idea that a person might 
simply find an incongruity funny is not to be accepted. In cases in which an incongrui-
ty does genuinely figure in the humor process, that which brings a laugh must be 
something more than the mere recognition of that incongruity (and in fact this "some-
thing more" will be found to be a cognitive switch). Moreover, if this objection be set 
aside, the following question must be answered: How is it that a person might simply 
find an incongruity funny? This calls for an explanation. It will not do simply to say 
that it happens. Is it possible that a person might simply find a regular hexagon 
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funny? If so, then the usual incongruity thesis is false, and if not, what are the rele-
vant differences between an incongruity and a regular hexagon? Morever, the laughter 
of humor (not to mention other types of laughter) is not an expression of the feeling 
of amusement. The relation between laughter and the feeling of amusement is quite 
different. As an experiment, read the following passage, from Woody Allen, and make 
the utmost effort to avoid showing the slightest outward sign of amusement: 
    I was sitting in my office, cleaning the debris out of my thirty-eight and 
     wondering where my next case was coming from. I like being a private eye,and 
     even though once in a while I've had my gums massaged with an automobile 
     jack, the sweet smell of greenbacks makes it all worth it. Not to mention the 
     dames, which are a minor preoccupation of mine that  I rank just ahead of 
     breathing. That's why, when the door to my office swung open and a long-
    haired blonde named Heather Butkiss came striding in and told me she was a 
    nudie model and needed my help, my salivary glands shifted into third. She
     wore a short skirt and a tight sweater and her figure described a set of parabo-
     las that could cause cardiac arrest in a yak. (Getting Even, Vintage, 1978,P. 103) 
If you allow yourself to become engaged in this narrative, it's very difficult to avoid 
showing any sign of amusement (provided, of course, that the humor is to your taste 
and that you're in a mood for it). For present purposes, however, the important point 
is this: if you succeed fully in stifling laughter of any form, including low-intensity 
forms such as smiling, you don't experience the pleasure of humor. A qualification is 
perhaps called for: in order to kill the pleasure of humor entirely, it might be necessary 
strictly to avoid imagining yourself laughing. However this may be, the laughter of 
humor does not express the pleasure with which it is associated: it brings this pleasure. 
It's possible to explain this in terms of the cognitive-switch theory: initial-stage 
unrelaxation does not entail pleasure more than pain, and, just as a cognitive switch in 
a nonhumorous case does not itself entail pleasure, or at any rate not pleasure of the 
intensity that is in question in humor, neither does the effective cognitive switch in a 
humorous case; rather, it is final-stage laughter which brings the basic pleasure of 
humor, which it does by many different mechanisms. Moreover, setting this objection 
aside, it will not do simply to say that laughter is the natural expression of the feeling 
of amusement, for the fact that this is so, if it is a fact, calls for explanation. 
 A second, quite different account is to be found, at least implicitly, in the writings of 
incongruity theorists. It runs as follows: The subject recognizes an incongruity, puzzles 
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over it, suddenly sees the point or meaning, and laughs. —But this won't do either. 
This account implies that a cognitive switch is crucial to the humor process and the 
recognition of the incongruity inessential, for the sequence puzzling-insight by no 
means need start with the recognition of an incongruity. Moreover, this account does 
not explain why the subject laughs when he sees the point, and it is possible to ex-
plain this plausibly only by reference to the cognitive switch in question—that is, 
only in terms of cognitive-switch theory. If, however, incongruities are not funny in 
themselves, and if the attempt to explain humor in terms of a process wherein an in-
congruity is recognized and then resolved fails, it becomes very difficult to see how it 
is that the recognition of an incongruity leads  to laughter in every case in which 
humor is experienced and laughter occurs. 
 Explanation  in terms of the cognitive-switch theory: In any of a number of ways, a 
virtually unlimited number, the subject becomes unrelaxed to a greater or lesser 
extent. Then, due to a stimulus factor, which might take any of a virtually unlimited 
number of forms, he makes a more or less sudden cognitive switch, as for example in 
interpretation, orientation, or expectation, a cognitive switch which, again, might take 
any of a virtually unlimited number of forms but renders the just-mentioned state of 
unrelaxation pointless in whole or in part. Then he relaxes more or less explosively 
through laughter of some from, through laughter because laughter is the most efficient 
means of relaxation available at the moment in question. —This account, true or not, 
is at least essentially complete and sufficiently plausible to warrant testing. 
 (2) Humor tends strongly to bring relaxation, though it does not always do so. This 
is one of the most obvious and from a practical point of view most important things 
about it. But just how does humor bring relaxation, when it does? Explanation by ref-
erence to the usual incongruity thesis: The problem here is to describe a humor pro-
cess which in one way or another brings relaxation, and in which the recognition of an 
incongruity plays an essential role. The most tempting approach, perhaps, is to try to 
show how it is that the recognition of an incongruity constitutes an essential step in a 
process which leads to laughter, and then explain how laughter brings relaxation, for 
it is quite plausible to claim that laughter brings relaxation. The upshot of the argu-
mentation of the previous section, however, is that it's extremely difficult if not impos-
sible to explain the first of these linkages. But until this has been explained, it is of 
course illegitimate to appeal to the relaxing effects of laughter. A second approach is 
simply to postulate that the perception of an incongruity is in itself relaxing. This, 
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however, clearly won't do. In the first place, this postulate does not relate the percep-
tion of an incongruity with humor with relaxation, but only the first and third of 
these terms. In the second place, it relates these two terms incorrectly, for the percep-
tion of an incongruity, if it has any effect on level of unrelaxation, tends to increase 
rather than decrease it. Incongruities aren't funny and they aren't relaxing either. In 
the third place, it's clear intuitively that it is laughter which carries the primary 
relaxing effect of humor. Incongruity theorists, furthermore, appear not to have 
mentioned anything else reference to which might explain how the recognition of an 
incongruity is connected with the relaxation humor undoubtedly can bring. And with 
good reason: the problem is essentially unsolvable. 
 Explanation in terms of the cognitive-switch theory: The basic humor process as 
described by the cognitive-switch theory culminates in laughter, but this culminating 
laughter brings relaxation in various ways—for example, in that it is a form of physi-
cal exercise, produces distracting auditory and kinesthetic sensations, yields pleasure, 
which it does primarily, perhaps, in that it yields relaxation, and serves as a signal, 
even to the laugher himself, that relaxation is in order. Moreover, the subject might 
well begin to relax even before he starts to laugh. If he is engaged in a more or less 
difficult task, then simply in consenting to listen to a joke, he takes a vacation, as it 
were, from that task. Also if the joke-teller is in a light-hearted mood, the subject, in 
consenting to listen, opens himself to the influence of that mood. Also, he might well 
anticipate that he will relax on hearing the punch line, and this anticipation of relaxa-
tion might itself be relaxing. In addition, in a particular case, a humor process of a sort 
recognized by the cognitive-switch theory might bring relaxation in any of innumera-
ble other ways, many of them comparatively complex and indirect, as by fostering 
emotional detachment. 
    (3) The psychologist Thomas R. Schultz writes: 
     ...The case of humour is somewhat paradoxical in that a relatively mild stimulus 
     is capable of eliciting a rather violent, stereotyped emotional responsein the 
     form of laughter. Perhaps the pleasure experienced in humour is greatly 
    intensified by the suddenness with which the sequence of arousal induction and 
     reduction occurs. Perceiving and then resolving the incongruity in a joke proba-
     bly occurs within a second or less, certainly much more rapidly than the arousal 
     and satisfaction sequence in most other motivational systems. (Humour and 
    Laughter, ed. Chapman and Foot, Wiley, 1976, pp. 16-17) 
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The question Schultz raises here is: How is it that a low-intensity stimulus such as a 
single word spoken softly, a slight gesture, a faint sound from a mechanical device, etc. 
can elicit such a high-intensity response  as convulsive, roaring, thigh-slapping 
laughter? This, of course, is one of the ancient "paradoxes" of humor. It's not entirely 
clear from the passage just quoted exactly how Schultz proposes to resolve it, but his 
thinking appears to run along these lines: The subject perceives an incongruity. This 
induces arousal, and hence, perhaps, brings pleasure. Then he resolves the incongruity. 
This reduces arousal and hence brings pleasure. But this sequence of arousal induction 
and reduction occurs very rapidly, and this factor of rapidity greatly intensifies the 
pleasure. This intense pleasure is expressed in intense laughter. —The fundamental 
objection to this account is this: Any incongruity-and-resolution theory of humor is 
profoundly incoherent in that the thesis that the subject must "resolve" the incongru-
ity in question, that is, find an underlying congruity, if he is to experience the humor 
in the case renders untenable the thesis that he must, in the first place, recognize that 
incongruity, for again, if it is finding a congruity which brings laughter and feelings of 
amusement, there is no reason why the humor process must start with the recognition 
of an incongruity: it can start with the question "Where's the congruity?" and proceed 
through a process of puzzling to the effective cognitive switch, and if it does in fact 
start with the recognition of an incongruity, this is a false start which leads nowhere, 
unless it happens to lead to the true start. 
 The objection just brought is fatal to Schultz's account. It is not, however, the only 
fatal objection that can be brought. Schultz postulates that the arousal-reduction phase 
of the humor process runs its course in just a fraction of a second. One wonders how 
he conceives of this phase. Most people, surely, have had the experience of seeing or 
hearing something funny and laughing hard in response for five or even ten minutes 
(though of course it is to be expected that this does not apply to social groups in or 
for which such behavior is severely discouraged). If arousal-reduction, however, takes 
just a split second, then how is the occurrence of five minutes of laughter to be 
explained? Is it possible that a split second of arousal-reduction might bring five 
minutes of pleasure—in which case it might be possible to maintain that the five 
minutes of laughter functions to express this pleasure? This appears most unlikely: 
with, perhaps, minor qualifications, arousal-reduction brings pleasure while it lasts. 
Bouts of laughter which occur in response to a single witticism, funny sight, or what-
ever and last five or ten minutes tend to occur among people who are greatly in need 
 —  33  —
                      A 5Z 
of relaxation. It's reasonable to hypothesize that in such cases, laughter lasts for 
minutes on end precisely because it takes minutes on end for it to fulfill its function of 
bringing the level of arousal (unrelaxation) down to a normal level, whatever it might 
be that determines that level, that it brings pleasure in the process, and that this pleas-
ure functions at least in part to motivate continued laughter, which is to say, to moti-
vate a continuation of the healthful process of relaxation through laughter. A further 
consideration supports this line of reasoning: It's clear that "resolving the 
incongruity" or "seeing the point," that is, recognizing the underlying congruity, 
whatever precisely this involves, does not in itself suffice to reduce arousal. Arousal-
reduction follows insight and is effected by some mechanism which is not to be 
identified with the process or event of recognizing the underlying congruity. Now the 
arousal reduced by humor, in many if not all cases, is what might be called bodily 
arousal that is, it is not confined to the central nervous system. It's especially clear 
that this is true of those cases in which the arousal is intense. It stands to reason, then, 
that in many cases at any rate, and in all those in which the arousal is intense, the 
mechanism of arousal-reduction involves the body in  a, more or less gross and outward 
way. The question arises what this  mechanism might be. The obvious candidate, of 
course, is laughter. Laughter, then, once again, does not function primarily to express 
the pleasure with which it is associated, but rather reduces arousal and hence brings 
pleasure. It appears that in effect, Schultz proposes the following schema: insight leads 
(somehow) to arousal-reduction which brings pleasure which leads to laughter. But 
the following schema is more plausible as an explanation of cases of the type he has in 
mind: insight leads to laughter (in the way described by the cognitive-switch theory) 
and laughter brings arousal-reduction which brings pleasure. For present purposes, 
however, the important point is this: Typically, the arousal-reduction phase or the 
humor process lasts longer than the fraction of a second Schultz envisions, and not 
uncommonly it lasts for minutes on end, and in cases of this latter type, with few if 
any exceptions, laughter and pleasure are especially intense. Furthermore, it's clear 
that the arousal-induction phase often takes longer than the split second Schultz envi-
sions. The arousal reduced, which might, for example, take the form of anxiety, might 
well be hours and might indeed be decades in building, and once again, laughter and 
pleasure are likely to be intense in these drawn-out cases. How, then, can it be that the 
intensity of the laughter and pleasure associated with humor is to be explained by ref-
erence to "the suddenness with which the sequence of arousal induction and reduction 
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 occurs"  ? Clearly, this explanation doesn't work. Schultz links the arousal-induction 
and arousal-reduction which figure in the humor process far too closely with, respec-
tively, the stimulus provided by the joke or more generally the humorous material 
itself, and the cognitive switch to insight: the full stimulus to arousal often goes far 
beyond any provided by the humorous material itself, and the process of arousal-
reduction goes far beyond the cognitive switch to insight. 
 The question under discussion, to repeat, is this: How is it that a low-intensity stimu-
lus can elicit such a high-intensity response as convulsive laughter? Schultz fails to re-
solve this "paradox"  within  the context of incongruity theory. But perhaps a simpler 
approach will work: A low-intensity stimulus in the form of an incongruity can quite 
simply trigger high-intensity laughter. But this, of course, is nonsense, for 
incongruities are not funny. The cognitive-switch theory, in contrast, suggests a prom-
ising explanation: A low-intensity stimulus, one which in itself appears most 
unimpressive, might well, for all its lack of intensity, lead in one way or another to a 
cognitive switch of one type or another, as for example a shift from puzzlement to in-
sight, and this switch in turn might well prompt explosive relaxation in laughter of 
any degree of intensity, which laughter can bring pleasure of any degree of intensity. 
The intensity of the laughter depends largely, though  .perhaps not entirely, on the in-
tensity of the arousal which is rendered pointless by the cognitive switch. It does not, 
however—and this is the crux of the solution—depend on the intensity of the stimu-
lus factor or factors which lead to or prompt the cognitive switch. In sum, a low-
intensity stimulus can set in motion a process which leads indirectly or directly to a 
cognitive switch which precipitates intense laughter the intensity of which derives 
largely from the intensity of the state of arousal at the moment of the switch. 
 Once again, then, simple incongruity theory, the idea that incongruities of certain 
types simply are funny under certain conditions, offers no plausible explanation, the 
only "sophisticated" incongruity theory that has been proposed, incongruity-and-
resolution theory, offers no plausible explanation in terms of incongruity, if only be-
cause it must itself be regarded as an abandonment of incongruity theory in favor of 
cognitive-switch theory, and cognitive-switch theory offers a plausible, unforced expla-
nation. 
 (4) Why is it that a joke usually isn't as funny the second time around? Explanation 
in terms of simple incongruity theory: The second time one hears a joke, the incongru-
ity is familiar and stale and hence not as funny.—But this fails for several reasons. To 
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begin with, in itself, an incongruity isn't at all funny even the first time around. More-
over, in effect, this explanation merely restates a presupposition of the  question—viz., 
that a joke isn't as funny the second time—and hence goes no distance towards 
answering it. Moreover, the beauty of a beautiful painting or piece of music is often 
felt even more deeply on the second or third exposure. Why shouldn't it happen fre-
quently that the funniness of a funny incongruity is felt even more intensely the 
second or third time around? This question stands, of course, even if the comparison 
with art and music falls. The answer must be drawn from the nature of incongruities: 
it is, of course, illegitimate to appeal to the fact that a joke is, generally speaking, 
funnier the first time. In short, simple incongruity theory offers no plausible explana-
tion. Explanation in terms of incongruity-and-resolution theory: The second time 
around, the subject is aware of the resolution from the start and hence  licks any 
reason to go through a process of puzzling and does not experience sudden  insight.— 
But, since the "resolution" in question, the discovery of an underlying congruity, need 
not proceed from the recognition of an incongruity, this explanation cannot be said 
successfully to incorporate the usual incongruity thesis. It is not an explanation in 
terms of incongruity but rather, in effect, an explanation in terms of a limited, narrow 
cognitive-switch theory. 
 Explanation in terms of the cognitive-switch theory: As for those cases in which the 
subject puzzles through to an insight which precipitates laughter, since he already 
knows the solution to the puzzle the second time around, he has no occasion to puzzle 
further and hence unrelaxation doesn't build. Moreover, since he has already made the 
cognitive switch to insight, no cognitive switch occurs of the type which tends to 
bring laughter, of the type which brought laughter the first time around. This, to be 
sure, is only one type of case out of indefinitely many, but the explanation can readily 
be generalized to cover the entire field of humor, as follows. The effective cognitive 
 ,switch is a shift to a perception, interpretation, orientation, or whatever which does 
not support unrelaxation at a high level; it follows that the post-switch stance is one 
which doesn't support unrelaxation at a high level. The subject, however, having al-
ready heard the joke, is already in this stance, and so the conditions under which 
unrelaxation might build, under which it did build the first time around, do not exist. 
Moreover, the subject fails to make the effective cognitive switch, for the simple 
reason that he has already made it: he doesn't make the transition from stance  A  to 
stance B because he's already in stance B. The point is that in very many cases, one or 
 —  36  —
                   Further Arguments against Incongruity Theory 
the other or both of these circumstances more or less kills the humor the second time 
around. In addition, if the subject laughs hard at a joke the first time he hears it and 
that same joke is then repeated immediately, there is little or 'no occasion for him to 
relax, for the simple reason that he has already done so. 
 In this as in many cases, incongruity theory fails to yield even one plausible expla-
nation whereas the cognitive-switch theory yields several complementary ones. 
     (5) The ethologist Konrad Lorenz observes: 
     ...Barking dogs may occasionally bite, but laughing men hardly ever shoot. 
His point is that "laughter even at its most intense is never in danger of 
regressing and causing the primal aggressive behaviour to break through." (On Ag-
gression, Methuen, 1979, p. 254) His observation about laughing men, however, brings 
to mind a different point: Laughter tends to render a person incapable, for better or 
worse, of deliberate action. But just how does it do this? Explanation in terms of incon-
gruity theory: The laughter of humor brings pleasure, but the possibility of gaining 
this pleasure motivates focus on the funny incongruity in the case, for this tends to 
prolong laughter; this focus, however, amounts, if only momentarily, to a powerful dis-
traction. Moreover, the sounds and other sensations produced by laughter are also 
highly distracting. Moreover, on a physical level, laughter tends to be paralyzing, both 
while it occurs and shortly thereafter.—It appears to be true that focus on an absurd 
image, witty remark, or the like can have the effect of prolonging laughter. This stimu-
lus, however, need not take the form of an incongruity; in fact, since incongruities are 
not at all funny in themselves, it may be assumed that it very seldom does. To take 
just one example, Adlai Stevenson (clearly playing upon the Socratic dictum "The 
unexamined life is not worth living") one remarked, "Life without laughter is not 
worth examining." Running this material through one's mind repeatedly might well 
prolong laughter, but there is no incongruity in it: neither Socrates' nor Stevenson's 
statement is at all incongruous in itself, and by logical principles, of course, the two 
are perfectly consistent. That the latter is a skillful play on the former makes it clever 
and funny, not incongruous. Thus the reference in the explanation in terms of incon-
gruity theory to "focus on the funny incongruity in the case," which might appear to 
establish a connection between the usual incongruity thesis and the distracting effect 
in question, is unacceptable and this connection illusory. Moreover, the proposition 
that laughter brings pleasure, while true, lacks any connection with the usual incon-
gruity thesis and hence with incongruity theory. The same goes for the observation 
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that the sounds and other sensations produced by laughter are highly distracting: this 
is true, but it does not fit into any plausible picture of which the usual incongruity 
thesis forms an integral part. The same goes also for the observation that laughter 
tends to be paralyzing on a physical level. This, moreover, calls for explanation: why is 
laughter paralyzing on a physical level? 
  It bears stressing, though it's obvious, that to explain how laughter inhibits deliber-
ate action, and to explain this in terms of incongruity theory, are two quite different 
things. It might be felt that since this inhibitory effect has to do specifically with 
laughter, it is illegitimate to demand that it be explained in terms of incongruity 
theory. A moment's reflection, however, shows that this isn't so. If the usual incongrui-
ty thesis is true, then it must be possible to fit the recognition of an incongruity, 
laughter, and the inhibitory effect of laughter into a single coherent picture, and hence 
it is quite legitimate to demand that this be done. Similarly for everything else that 
relates to humor. 
  Explanation in terms of the cognitive-switch theory: The laughter of humor brings 
pleasure, but the possibility of gaining this pleasure often motivates focus on an 
absurd image, witty remark, or the like, and in many cases this focus amounts to a 
powerful distraction. Moreover, the sounds and other sensations produced by laughter 
are also highly distracting. Moreover, precisely in that it brings relaxation, laughter 
tends to be paralyzing both while it occurs and shortly thereafter. In sum, it is difficult 
to take vigorous deliberate action while one is distracted and undergoing rapid relaxa-
tion or thoroughly relaxed.—This, of course, is more or less the same explanation as 
that given above. It is not open to the same objection, however, and this, in large part, 
is because laughter itself fits neatly into the picture painted by the cognitive-switch 
theory. 
  (6) Jokes, witticisms, and so on which elicit hostility or thoughts of sex tend to be es-
pecially funny (to people who don't object to them on moral or other grounds, at any 
rate). Why is this? In this connection, the incongruity theorist McGhee writes: 
     ...Very few people really break up laughing at pure incongruities,but the addi-
     tion of allusions to sex or aggression may produce this effect. Readers can draw 
     their own conclusions about how funny the following jokes would be without 
     the contribution of sex or aggression. 
       One  bachelor asked another, "How did you like your stay at the nudist 
        camp?" 
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        "Well
," he answered, "It was okay after a while. The first three days were 
       the hardest." 
      MR. BROWN: "This is disgusting. I just found out that the janitor has made 
      love to every woman in the building except one." 
      HIS WIFE: "Oh, it must be that stuck-up Mrs. Johnson on the third floor." 
      (Humor, Freeman, 1979, p.  9  )
 Clearly, McGhee assumes that in cases like these, once "the contribution of sex or 
aggression" has been subtracted, as it were, there remains the same incongruity and, 
fundamentally, the same joke, and that the joke is the same because it is based on the 
same incongruity in the same way, it might be best to add. He assumes that the rec-
ognition of an incongruity constitutes the core of the mechanics of any such case, as it 
were, that the allusions to sex or topics which elicit hostility serve merely to heighten 
the level of arousal—as if any other set of allusions, to  any subject, that would 
heighten arousal without inducing a mood inimical to humor would do as well and 
that this high level of arousal accounts for the intensity of the response. It is not 
McGhee's purpose in this passage to answer the question at hand, but, in effect, he 
does offer an answer. His answer is this: Basically, the experience of humor in any 
given case develops from the recognition of an incongruity, but a joke which elicits 
hostility or thoughts of sex on a given occasion thereby arouses the subject, and this 
high level of arousal accounts for the intensity of the laughter the joke elicits.—This 
answer, however, is unacceptable for several reasons. To begin with, it fails to explain 
how an experience of humor might develop from the recognition of an incongruity. 
Moreover, it fails to explain the connection between a high level of  arousal and intense 
laughter. Moreover, in several ways, the analysis it entails fails to apply to McGhee's 
own examples. 
 Consider first the joke about the nudist camp. To begin with, precisely what incon-
gruity is in question here—that is, in the original? This is by no means easy to say. 
It's tempting to propose that the second bachelor's reply (henceforth "the reply") is 
incongruous with the first bachelor's question (henceforth "the question") in that at 
first sight it doesn't make any sense. But just what does it mean to say that it doesn't 
make any sense? To the question "How did you like your stay?"—at the nudist camp, 
at the boy scout camp, in Chicago, on the moon, or anywhere else—surely it makes 
perfectly good sense to reply  "Well, it was okay after a while—the first three days 
were the hardest." The reply, then, is not in the least incongruous with the question. 
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Nevertheless, it's true that at first sight it doesn't make sense. That is, it doesn't make 
sense as a joking reply: it isn't funny. Clearly, this is what gives rise to the impression 
that an incongruity figures in the case. The question to consider, then, is this: The typ-
ical subject doesn't get the joke immediately. Does this imply that he perceives an in-
congruity? Does he, for example, perceive an incongruity between the message "This 
is a joke" and his failure to see any joke? Compare this with a similar case. You face 
column of five three-digit numbers. Your task is to add them up. You don't know the 
sum at the moment because you haven't set to work yet. Does this imply that you per-
ceive an incongruity? Of course not. You know that there's a solution and you know 
you don't have it yet; incongruity has nothing to do with the case. The same holds for 
the joke about the nudist camp. The subject believes that there's solution, for he 
knows that it's a joke, and he knows that he hasn't found any solution yet; it's absurd 
to claim that this implies he recognizes an incongruity. In fact there is no incongruity 
between the message "This is a joke" and the subject's failure to get it instantly. 
Hence it's not surprising that he doesn't recognize any incongruity in this. A person 
might indeed come to the conclusion that there simply is no joke here—if, for exam-
ple, he's not clever enough to get it, or, being a young  child, he doesn't know anything 
about sex, or he feels such a horror of sex that his recognition of the secondary, 
insightful interpretation of the reply ("My erection was hardest the first three  days") 
is totally repressed. It might be said that to such a person, an incongruity appears be-
tween the message "This is a joke" and the fact that no joke manifests itself. By hy-
pothesis, however, he fails to experience the humor in the case, and so his viewpoint is 
irrelevant. Initial impressions notwithstanding, there is no incongruity here that might 
be considered relevant by any stretch of the imagination. 
 Next, let us ask what remains of the joke once all allusions to sex, or at any rate all 
relevant, functional allusions, have been subtracted, as it were. There is no single way 
to perform this subtraction. One way to do it is to leave the wording unaltered and 
posit a subject who, for whatever reason, simply doesn't think of the secondary inter-
pretation of the reply ("My erection was hardest the first three  days"). This is tanta-
mount to posting that the reply ("The first three days were the hardest") simply 
doesn't bear or even suggest this interpretation. But such a subject, of course, just 
doesn't get the joke—that is, the original joke. This should give one pause, however, 
for it implies that once this, the main or functional allusion to sex, to say nothing of 
any subsidiary allusions, has been subtracted, nothing remains of the original joke. 
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McGhee assumes, to repeat, that once "the contribution of sex" has been subtracted, 
there remains the same incongruity and, fundamentally, the same joke. In fact, howev-
er, there is no incongruity in the first place, and to subtract the relevant allusion to 
sex is to subtract the entire joke: what remains is, at best, an entirely different joke, or 
an unhumorous formulation. 
 Another way, perhaps more thorough, to subtract the allusions to sex is to substi-
tute carefully for the expressions "bachelor" and "the nudist camp," which support 
the sexual pun of the original and are, quite apart from this, likely to bring sex to 
mind, and for "hardest," in order to make it more certain that the subject will not 
thick of erections. This yields, for example, the following: 
     One boy asked  another,  "How did you like your stay at swimming camp?" 
     "Well
," he answered, "It was okay after a while. The first three days were the 
     toughest." 
or even better 
    One little girl asked  another,  "How did you like  your  stay at camp?" 
 "Well,"she  answered,  "It was okay after a while. The first three days were the 
     most difficult." 
The trouble, of course, is that these formulations aren't jokes (or more accurately, they 
don't function as jokes unless joke-teller and audience are clever enough—fiendishly 
clever—to see jokes in them). This outcome is not surprising. Contrary to McGhee, 
the core of the psychodynamics of the original joke is not the recognition of an incon-
gruity, but rather a cognitive switch from puzzling to a certain insight, and the cir-
cumstances which make this switch possible have been eliminated. It is merely to be 
expected, then, that no joke remains. Thus, once again, contrary to McGhee, to elimi-
nate the allusions to sex is to eliminate the joke entirely. 
 In favorable circumstances and with the aid of co-conspirators, one might present 
the formulation concerning the boy who went to swimming camp as a joke, encourage 
the subject/victim to struggle through to a solution, choose just the right moment to 
inform him that in fact there is no joke, and thus induce a mild experience of humor 
 though of course the entire effort might backfire. For this purpose, this formula-
tion is better than the one concerning the little girl who went to camp, for the latter 
fails almost entirely to support the pretense that there is a solution. In the course of 
puzzling, the subject might well come to feel that there's an incongruity between the 
message "This is a joke" and the fact that no joke appears to him. There are three 
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things to notice, however. First, this incongruity is not at all funny, and it's not neces-
sary that the subject recognize it in order to experience the humor in the case: what is 
necessary is that he make at least a small effort to find a joke. Secondly, it is not the 
same incongruity as appears in the original, for no incongruity appears in the original. 
Thirdly, this jest, however it is to be analyzed, clearly is not to be idenitifed with the 
original joke. 
  Now consider the joke about the janitor. The same considerations apply here. The 
wife's response ("Oh, it must be that stuck-up Mrs. Johnson on the third floor") is per-
fectly congruous with her husband's comment ("I just found out that the janitor has 
made love to every woman in the building except  one"). The typical listener doesn't 
 get the joke instantly, but this by no means entails that he recognizes an incongruity: 
there is, again, no incongruity between the message "This is a joke" and one's failure 
to get the joke instantly. The crucial allusion to sex is, of course, the logical implica-
tion that the janitor has made love to the wife. According to McGhee's analysis, a lis-
tener who fails to perceive this implication might yet enjoy the joke, though less in-
tensely, probably, than he would have if he had perceived it. But this isn't so. In fact, a 
listener who doesn't perceive this implication simply doesn't get the joke at all. 
  To repeat, it's clear that jokes and so on which elicit hostility or thoughts of sex 
tend to be especially funny, and the question is why. McGhee's explanation in terms of 
incongruity theory fails several times over. It's possible, however, to give a simple, 
unstrained explanation terms of the cognitive-switch theory: Usually, in cases of the 
sort in question, the allusions which elicit hostility or thoughts of sex thereby elicit 
arousal of a relatively high level, and hence the drop, as it were, to a normal level of 
arousal is long. Hence the laughter which functions to bring about this drop tends to 
be of relatively long duration or high intensity or both, and hence, too, the pleasure 
which this laughter brings tends to be of long duration or high intensity. 
  (7) As the early incongruist Hutcheson notes, as a general rule, a light-hearted, happy 
mood predisposes a person to find things humorous. On the other hand, people tend to 
be disinclined to joke or to lend their ears to jokes about things they are trying hard 
to accomplish, or about things, as for example religious tenets, which they take very 
seriously. But why is this? Explanation in terms of incongruity theory: A person is 
more likely to notice incongruities, and hence more likely to experience humor, when 
he's in a light-hearted mood than when he's in a serious mood. But this won't do at 
all. To begin with, it simply isn't true that a person is more likely to notice 
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incongruities when he's in a light-hearted mood. There is no relevant difference in this 
connection between incongruities and, say, hexagons, or coins of a certain denomina-
tion. To say that a person is more likely to notice incongruities when he's in a light-
hearted mood is like saying that he's more likely to notice hexagonal configurations 
when he's in a light-hearted mood. Perhaps, then, the explanation ought to be amended 
to read as follows: A person is more likely to notice incongruities of the type which 
make for amusement, and hence is more likely to experience humor, when he's in a 
light-hearted mood.—But this fails too. It presupposes that incongruities of a certain 
type make for amusement, but this cannot be true, for the incongruities which humor 
stimuli manifest (from certain points of view, which are in fact irrelevant) are of no 
single, particular type. In addition, neither version of this explanation addresses the 
fact that a person who is trying hard to complete a certain task, or who takes a certain 
body of doctrine very seriously, tends actively to resist joking about that particular 
task or body of doctrine. But perhaps it is possible to meet this objection by adding: A 
person deeply committed to completing a task, or to a body of doctrine, is disinclined 
to find incongruities in it and hence may be expected to resist joking about it.—It 
isn't true, however, that a person deeply committed to a task or doctrine is disinclined 
to find incongruities in it, for as often as not such a person is eager to find and repair 
incongruities. Moreover, it's clear intuitively that in many cases in which a person 
does resist joking about something he takes very seriously or holds dear, his resistance 
is specifically a resistance to joking about it. A disinclination to recognize 
incongruities, however, is a disinclination to recognize them however they are 
presented: in sarcastic remarks, in balanced criticism, etc. In other words, this explana-
tion does not capture the phenomenon of resistance to joking in particular. 
  Another attempt at an explanation in terms of incongruity theory: A person in a 
state of depression lacks initiative, and hence lacks the initiative it takes to recognize 
(or recognize and resolve) incongruities; moreover, he might well be motivated to 
remain depressed, and thus might well resist engaging in humor, which is to say he 
might resist engaging in any effort to recognize or resolve an incongruity if he per-
ceives that to do so might bring an experience of humor.—The fact that a depressed 
person lacks initiative and the fact that he might resist humor in order to stay de-
pressed probably enter into the true explanation, whatever it is. These facts, however, 
can be integrated quite readily into any explanation, and thus to demonstrate that 
they can be integrated into an explanation in terms of incongruity theory is not to 
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show incongruity theory to any particular advantage. 
 Explanation in terms of the cognitive-switch theory: First, consider the case of the 
person who is intent on completing a task. He has several reasons to refuse to engage 
in joking about anything. To begin with, obviously, any time and energy devoted to 
joking is diverted from the task at hand. But joking brings laughter (in the way 
described by the cognitive-switch theory), and laughter brings pleasure (in ways 
described by the theory), and thus humor diverts attention seductively, with a prom-
ise of pleasure, and hence determined resistance is in order. Less obviously, even if the 
subject matter of the joke is precisely the task at hand, the process of following the 
joke (or making and following it) entails making a cognitive switch which consists in 
a sudden shift in point of view, interpretation, or orientation (as from making an 
effort to abandoning it); such a shift, however, is almost certain to prove distracting 
and interruptive. Moreover, (as postulated by the cognitive-switch theory and in ways 
described by it), laughter functions to bring relaxation and hence drains the arousal 
requisite to further effort. Moreover, in most cases at any rate, the sounds and other 
sensations produced by laughter, one's own or that of others, are highly distracting. 
 Next, consider the person who is determined to hold a certain individual, institution, 
or body of doctrine—a certain object—in awe. He has reason to resist joking about 
that object, for humor often diminishes respect or awe. The question is how. Respect 
may be said to have two components: an emotional one (e.g., fear or excitement), and 
an intellectual one (e.g., the belief that he/she/it is very great). A joke about a given 
individual or other object, however, brings relaxation (in the way, or more accurately 
the ways, described by the cognitive-switch theory) precisely while the subject's atten-
tion is focused on that object, and hence diminishes, at least momentarily, the emotion-
al component of respect for that object. Moreover, during the moment he is relaxed, 
the subject is likely to be relatively open to information (or misinformation) tailored 
to diminish the intellectual component of respect; a hostile joke, however, can deliver 
such information just before that moment arrives—in the form of the stimulus factor 
which prompts the cognitive switch which precipitates the laughter which brings re-
laxation. Moreover, in some cases at any rate, a person who laughs at a joke which rid-
icules thereby signals that he accepts, or at any rate is willing momentarily to enter-
tain, an unfavorable image of the object of ridicule. But this signal can do two things: 
it can mark him in the eyes of others or in his own as a person who does not hold that 
object in reverence, and it can encourage those others to  follOw his example, that is, to 
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cease holding it in reverence. 
  Finally, consider the person who is for the moment unfocussed, i.e., not deeply en-
gaged in a task, open, i.e., not defensive, and carefree. By hypothesis, he is free to 
devote time and effort to the work of inventing, delivering, or following a joke. This 
includes following an unintended joke: that is, he is free to devote time to scanning for 
circumstances a recognition of which would in his case prompt a cognitive switch 
which would precipitate laughter. Also, he is free to allow himself to undergo a 
cognitive switch, or one cognitive switch after another, however distracting or 
interruptive this might be, and free to allow himself to lose respect or to cause others 
to lose respect for this or that object. In a word, he is free to engage in humor. 
  (8) In many cases, perhaps most though certainly not all, the element of surprise is 
more or less essential to the humorous effect. But just why is this? Explanation in 
terms of simple incongruity theory: The perception of an incongruity is arousing, but 
surprise heightens arousal and thereby heightens the humorous effect. But this 
won't do. To begin with, it's woefully incomplete in that it doesn't explain how sur-
prise enters into the humor process or how arousal translates into an experience of 
humor. Moreover, it addresses the question how surprise augments the humorous 
effect and thus fails to address the question at hand: how it is that surprise is essential 
to the humorous effect (in those cases in which it is). Another attempt: The perception 
of an incongruity is essential to the experience of humor but arousal is also essential, 
and in the cases in question it is surprise, not the perception of an incongruity, which 
generates arousal.—But this fails too. To begin with, once again, it doesn't explain 
how surprise enters into the humor process or how arousal translates into an  experi-
ence of humor. Moreover, if surprise generates arousal which translates into amuse-
ment and the perception of the incongruity in the case doesn't, then what role does the 
recognition of that incongruity play in the humor process? Why is it also essential? 
There is no good answer to  this. question. Explanation in terms of incongruity-and-
resolution theory: An incongruity which surprises the subject thereby generates 
heightened arousal which translates into heightened amusement when the subject re-
solves the incongruity.—To begin with, this is open to objections very similar to 
those just detailed: it fails to explain just how arousal translates into amusement when 
the subject "resolves the incongruity," etc. Moreover, it collapses into an explanation 
in terms of cognitive-switch theory. If arousal translates into amusement at the 
moment the subject "resolves the incongruity," that is, finds a hidden congruity, then 
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the cognitive switch which consists in or begins with the recognition of the hidden 
congruity is essential to the humor process, but the perception of an incongruity is 
not. Another attempt at an explanation in terms of incongruity-and-resolution theory: 
If the resolution is something clever and surprising, then it's likely that the subject 
will discover it suddenly after arousal has built to a maximum, or, if he isn't able to 
discover it at all, the joke-teller has an opportunity to reveal it to him at just the 
moment arousal peaks; but a maximum of arousal yields a maximum of amusement. 
—This , again, fails to explain how arousal translates into an experience of humor. It 
is, however, a more or less reasonable explanation as far as it goes. The rub is that it 
collapses into an explanation in terms of cognitive-switch theory, for it puts "the reso-
lution," that is, a cognitive switch, at the center of the picture, and fails even to hint at 
a reason why the perception of an incongruity ought to be considered essential to the 
process. 
 Explanation in terms of the cognitive-switch theory: If the cognitive switch occurs 
prematurely, which is to say before arousal builds sufficiently, then of course laughter 
and amusement will not result or will lack intensity. But if that which prompts the 
cognitive switch is something surprising, that is to say, something unlikely to occur to 
the subject unless he exercises his imagination strenuously, but yet immediately and 
thoroughly comprehensible once conceived, this greatly increases the likelihood that 
the cognitive switch will not occur prematurely, but rather suddenly and cleanly at 
the moment of peak arousal. But this, of course, makes for the most intense laughter 
and amusement. If in addition  it is admirably clever, the pleasures of intellectual stim-
ulation and ungrudging admiration may well augment that of amusement  proper.— 
This explanation is not open to the objection that it is incomplete in any fundamental 
way, for the cognitive-switch theory spells out, quite plausibly, all the relevant connec-
tions: among arousal, the cognitive switch, laughter, the experience of amusement, etc. 
  There is, then, a striking contrast between the cognitive-switch theory on the one 
hand and incongruity theory in general on the other in that the former readily sug-
gests plausible explanations of the various facets of the phenomenon of humor where-
as the latter doesn't. 
                                      *
  To the present day, humor continues to be a deep mystery. This is because humor 
theorists have not yet observed with any success that which goes on when a person 
experiences humor. This in turn is because that which goes on is, for some reason, 
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most difficult to observe. This very circumstance, however, poses serious difficulties 
for incongruity theory. The incongruities which humor stimuli manifest that is, 
manifest in most cases, from certain points of view—lie fully open to observation, in 
very many cases on the printed page or on videotape, where they can be examined 
minutely and at leisure. They are not particularly difficult to identify. If a humor ana-
lyst concludes that such and such constitutes and incongruity that is, in the diction-
ary sense, from such and such a point of view—it's unlikely that he will encounter 
much disagreement. The phenomenon called recognizing an incongruity is not particu-
larly problematical—or at any rate is not so in the context of the theory of humor. 
Likewise, in this context, the process of seeking and discovering a hidden congruity 
("resolving an incongruity") is not very problematical. In a word, the incongruities 
which humor stimuli manifest and the mental processes which relate to them are not 
at all mysterious: they can be observed quite easily. In contrast, that which lies at the 
core of the phenomenon of humor is, to repeat,  something quite mysterious, something 
most difficult to observe, and this suggests that it is something quite other than incon-
gruity. It stands to reason, moreover, that if the key to an understanding of humor did 
lie in incongruity, or in anything else so readily accessible to full and accurate obser-
vation, then humor would not be a mystery. 
 This argument applies to all stimulus-side theories : It is not notably difficult to ob-
serve the stimuli to humor accurately and fully. In contrast, the essential features of 
the basic humor process, whatever they might be, are, for some reason, very difficult 
indeed to observe accurately. This suggests that nothing in the former is to be 
identified with the latter. If certain elements or processes on the stimulus side did con-
stitute the essential features of the basic humor process, moreover, then, since the 
stimulus side lies fully open to observation, humor, though it might present questions, 
would not present a mystery as it does. 
 The fact that humor is a mystery poses no difficulties at all for the cognitive-switch 
theory. In fact, it makes possible a minor confirmation, for this theory explains this 
fact quite neatly. The cognitive-switch theory is a response-side theory: according to it, 
the essential character of humor lies in the full humor response. Laughter constitutes 
the final step in this response. It is only this final step, however, which lies quite open 
to observation. The initial portion portion of the full humor response, and especially 
the cognitive switch, is both complex and more or less hidden from view, i.e., difficult 
to observe accurately, and for precisely this reason it remains elusive. It is hidden in 
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the way silent thoughts are hidden: it consists of complex, largely unexpressed mental 
processes the exact description of which is precisely the vital question. Both the stimu-
lus side as a whole and the final step in the full humor response, to repeat, lie quite 
open to observation. If the initial portion of the full humor response were just as easy 
to observe—if, for example, it were always expressed out loud in words or in un-
mistakeable gestures—there would be no mystery to humor. It is ignorance of the 
nature of the initial portion of the full humor response which renders humor a mys-
tery.
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